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INTRODUCTION 
 In 2007, most Americans read that the federal government spent about $2.7 trillion 
dollars.1 In fact, the government spent more than $3.7 trillion.2 
 As the tremendous scope of the nation’s coming fiscal crisis has become more apparent,3 
scholars and experts from across the political spectrum have focused on developing reforms to 
maintain budgetary stability. But in focusing on the looming federal deficits and the need for 
reform, politicians and policy experts have by and large directed most of their efforts at 
proposing changes to Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid.4 While the expected growth in 
these three programs due both to the retirement of the Baby Boom generation and the rapid pace 
of health care inflation make these programs undoubtedly the greatest driver of projected future 
deficits,5 another significant and disturbing fiscal trend has largely flown under the radar.6 Since 
the most recent major tax code rewrite in 1986, Congress has increasingly and stealthily used so-
called “tax expenditures” to accomplish its policy objectives in lieu of annual appropriations. 
                                                 
1 Congressional Budget Office, Historical Budget Data, http://www.cbo.gov/budget/historical.shtml (last visited 
February 24, 2009). 
2 See THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, REPORT FOR CONGRESS, TAX EXPENDITURES: 
TRENDS AND CRITIQUES 22 (2008), available at http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL33641 (estimating the revenue 
losses from tax expenditures at $1.034 billion). See also CHYE-CHING HUANG & HANNAH SHAW, CTR. FOR BUDGET 
& POL’Y PRIORITIES, NEW ANALYSIS SHOWS “TAX EXPENDITURES” OVERALL ARE COSTLY AND REGRESSIVE: 
FINDINGS HIGHLIGHT NEED TO RESTRAIN TAX SUBSIDIES AS PART OF SOLUTION TO LONG-TERM BUDGET PROBLEMS 
1-2 (2009), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=2662 (estimating the total cost of individual tax 
expenditures only at over $700 billion, when incorporating interaction effects). See infra Part II.A for a discussion 
on the practical challenges to estimating the costs of tax expenditures. 
3 See, e.g., U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, THE NATION’S LONG-TERM FISCAL OUTLOOK, GAO-09-405SP 
(2009) [hereinafter “GAO FISCAL OUTLOOK”]. 
4 See, e.g., Ezra Klein, How Entitlement Reform Became Health Reform, AMER. PROSPECT, February 23, 2009, 
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=how_entitlement_reform_became_health_reform (“It's testament to how 
deeply the idea of an entitlement crisis has embedded itself in Washington that news that Obama planned a "fiscal 
accountability summit" was immediately taken as proof by The Washington Post that he was readying a frontal 
assault on Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security.”). 
5 GAO FISCAL OUTLOOK, supra note 3, at 1. 
6 See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY: TAX 
EXPENDITURES REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL COMMITMENT AND NEED TO BE REEXAMINED 47, GAO-05-
690 (2005) [hereinafter “GAO TAX EXPENDITURES”]. 
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A tax expenditure is an exclusion from gross income, a deduction, or a credit designed to 
accomplish a specific policy aim and which causes the government to take in fewer tax revenues 
than it would otherwise. Tax expenditures are familiar to every American taxpayer, even if they 
may not realize their budgetary significance. Among the largest tax expenditures are the 
deductions of home mortgage interest, the exclusion of employer-provided health insurance 
coverage from gross income, and deductions for charitable giving.7 But other tax expenditures 
are more obviously special interest giveaways, such as the complicated tax subsidies for the 
timber industry8 or percentage depletion allowances for natural resource extraction.9 While the 
mortgage and health insurance tax provisions are so familiar to average Americans that their 
existence may seem harmless, economists and commentators have long recognized that tax 
expenditures are in fact, if not in name, a form of budgetary entitlement.10 Just like Social 
Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, these provisions give direct financial benefits to certain 
Americans, cost the government money (in the form of forgone revenue), and do not require 
annual authorization or appropriation. 
These silent spending programs account for the difference between true budgetary reality 
and the federal spending total reported on the front page of the newspaper. Make no mistake—
subsidizing a particular taxpayer’s activity through a tax deduction is no different from a 
                                                 
7 HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 4, Table 1. 
8 See, e.g., I.R.C. §631(b) (2006); I.R.C. §194 (2006). See also THE CENTURY FOUND., BAD BREAKS ALL AROUND: 
THE REPORT OF THE CENTURY FOUNDATION WORKING GROUP ON TAX EXPENDITURES 23 (2002) (listing the timber 
subsidies as one of their “dirty dozen” tax expenditures that should be eliminated); Michael P. Ettlinger, Our Bucket 
is Leaking: Tax Expenditures and Loopholes in the Federal Budget, in BAD BREAKS ALL AROUND: THE REPORT OF 
THE CENTURY FOUNDATION WORKING GROUP ON TAX EXPENDITURES 131-33 (The Century Found. ed., 2002) 
(describing many timber tax breaks). 
9 See I.R.C. §613 (2006). See also Ettlinger, supra note 8, 129-30 (describing the oil and gas tax breaks including 
percentage depletion). 
10 Indeed, for this reason former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan prefers to call tax expenditures “tax 
entitlements.” HUANG & SHAW, supra note 2, at 1. See also HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 2 (“[T]ax expenditures 
are another form of entitlement spending.”); ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 
172 (3d ed. 2007) (“Tax expenditures are a form of entitlement.”). 
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budgetary standpoint than writing that taxpayer a check.11 And yet, because of the underlying 
structure of the tax code and because the federal budget process treats tax expenditures as hidden 
entitlements rather than as direct spending, the use of tax expenditures to advance social policy 
leads to deeply troubling consequences for both fiscal discipline and income inequality.  
This paper begins in Part I by discussing trends in the use of tax expenditures to achieve 
policy objectives, and describes briefly how political incentives perversely encourage tax 
expenditures over direct spending. Part II surveys the many criticisms of tax expenditures, 
including their lack of transparency and accountability and their intrinsic regressivity. Part III 
discusses possible ways to define tax expenditures—a threshold question before any structural 
reform can be undertaken. Finally, Part IV contains a list of potential budget procedural reforms 
that can reduce the temptation for Congress to continually expand the size of the tax expenditure 
budget. Some of these proposals are new ideas tailored to the current political realities, and 
others are adopted from old or abandoned reform proposals that deserve a new life in the face of 
the nation’s pressing fiscal challenges. 
 
I. TRENDS IN TAX EXPENDITURES 
 In fiscal year 2007, tax expenditures cost the federal government over $1 trillion—or 
7.6% of GDP—in forgone revenues.12 If all these tax expenditures were eliminated, the 
                                                 
11 Or, as Prof. Westmoreland explains, “whether taxes are collected and spent on widgets or whether widget-
purchasers can deduct widget costs from their taxes, federal money is used to reduce or pay the costs of widgets.” 
Tim Westmoreland, Standard Errors: How Budget Rules Distort Lawmaking, 95 GEO. L.J. 1555, 1568 (2007). See 
also Eric J. Toder, Tax Cuts or Spending – Does it Make a Difference?, NAT’L TAX J., September 2000, at 361, 363 
[hereinafter “Toder, Tax Cuts”], describing how it would be theoretically possible to structure the entire defense 
budget as a tax cut (i.e., by giving defense contractors a refundable tax credit for supplying weapons to the 
government for “free”) or to partially pay schoolteachers with a tax cut (as was once proposed in California). 
12 HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 22. Tax expenditures for individuals (i.e., excluding tax benefits for businesses) 
totaled $760.5 billion in FY2007. HUANG & SHAW, supra note 2, at 1. But see infra Part II.A (describing potential 
complications with estimating tax expenditures). 
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government could cut all tax rates by about 37% with the added revenue.13 This growth has been 
fueled by an expansion in the number of tax expenditures from 60 in 1972 to 170 and 2007.14 
Between 1980 and 2007, the share of total government support distributed through tax 
expenditures increased from 23% to 27%.15 Tax expenditures have grown faster than the 
economy in most years since data began being collected in 1967.16 But this modest percentage 
increase is misleading because the share of government support for health care delivered through 
tax expenditures has been decreasing due to the dramatic growth in the costs of government 
health care programs such as Medicare and Medicaid.17 In every other functional category of 
spending analyzed by the Congressional Research Service, the government is increasingly reliant 
on tax expenditures to accomplish its policy objectives.18 
 These trends are not surprising. Tax expenditures are politically attractive because they 
enable political leaders to “have their cake and eat it too”19 by “appear[ing] to reduce spending 
and taxes, while at the same time pursing an activist policy that promotes popular programs.”20 
Alternatively, tax expenditures can be attractive means for accomplishing unpopular policy 
objectives because tax expenditures are less visible to the public.21 
 
                                                 
13 Ettlinger, supra note 8, at 103. Note the rates could be cut by 37%, not by 37 percentage points. 
14 STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 4 
(Comm. Print 2008), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-37-08.pdf [hereinafter “JCT RECONSIDERATION”]. 
15 HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 14-15. 
16 Eric Toder, Evaluating Tax Incentives as a Tool for Social and Economic Policy, in BAD BREAKS ALL AROUND: 
THE REPORT OF THE CENTURY FOUNDATION WORKING GROUP ON TAX EXPENDITURES 39 (The Century Found. ed., 
2002) [hereinafter “Toder, Evaluating”]. 
17 HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, 16. 
18 Id. at 15, fig.2. In CRS’s “Commerce and Housing” category, for instance, virtually 100% of government support 
came through the tax code in 2007, up from about 90% in 1980. This category includes deductions for home 
mortgage interest and other tax subsidies for housing. 
19 CENTURY FOUND., supra note 8, at 13. 
20 Toder, Tax Cuts, supra note 11, at 361. 
21 See GAO TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 6, at 69 (“Because tax provisions are not as visible in the budget as 
spending programs, there is an incentive for policymakers to use tax provisions rather than spending programs to 
accomplish programmatic ends.”). 
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II. CRITICISMS OF TAX EXPENDITURES 
A. Transparency 
As the opening statistic suggested, because tax expenditures do not appear in reported 
outlay totals, the true size of government and the true scope of the government commitment to 
various policy objectives is hidden.22 But even if an attempt were made to explicitly count tax 
expenditures in the annual budget outlays totals,23 the cost of a tax expenditure is inherently 
uncertain. For example, while it is easy enough for the IRS to sum the total amount of special 
deductions claimed by the timber industry,24 repealing the deduction would not result in the 
government collecting exactly this sum in revenue because the repeal of the deductions would, at 
least in theory, cause fewer companies to engage in lumber production and perhaps to find other 
means to shelter income.25 By contrast, the cost of a discretionary spending program that directly 
subsidized lumber would be quite easy to calculate—simply the sum of all checks written by the 
treasury.  
Additionally, eliminating two separate tax expenditures that cost the government $100 
million each would not necessarily generate $200 million in additional revenue for two reasons. 
First, because taxpayers claim individual deductions only if the sum of such deductions exceeds 
the standard deduction, eliminating one tax expenditure may induce many taxpayers to instead 
claim the standard deduction, at which point those taxpayers would not see their liability reduced 
if a second deduction were also eliminated.26 Second, eliminating the first deduction may push 
some taxpayers into a higher bracket, increasing the revenue that would be gained by eliminating 
                                                 
22 CENTURY FOUND., supra note 8, at 11. 
23 See infra Part IV.C. 
24 But see infra Part III. 
25 See JCT RECONSIDERATION, supra note 14, at 5. 
26 HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 7; GAO TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 6, at 19. 
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the second deduction.27 Without a definite understanding of the cost of a tax expenditure, it can 
be even more difficult to assess whether the provision is worth the benefits to society.28 
Tax expenditures also obscure the administrative costs of achieving a policy objective. 
Whereas in a direct expenditure program, administrative costs are typically directly accounted 
for as part of any appropriation, the costs of “administering” a particular tax expenditure is 
inextricably mixed with the overall cost of tax enforcement.29 In other words, adding a new tax 
deduction to the Code does, at least in theory, incrementally increase IRS enforcement costs, 
either by directly requiring more IRS auditors or by causing the IRS to trade-off its limited 
enforcement resources to administer the new break.30 But exactly how much a given tax 
expenditure costs to administer can never be known for certain, limiting the ability of Congress 
to assess whether the benefits of a tax provision are worth its costs. 
Finally, tax expenditures also decrease the transparency of the tax code itself by 
increasing its complexity and requiring taxpayers to spend more time and effort preparing 
returns, and potentially increasing the risk of fraud. In 2007, taxpayers who filled out only forms 
1040A or 1040EZ spent an average of 10.4 hours completing their returns.31 By contrast, 
taxpayers who filed form 1040, which is required to take advantage of the vast majority of tax 
expenditures, spent 33.5 hours on average preparing returns.32 Increased complexity also 
“endanger[s] the voluntary compliance on which tax administration depends” by creating 
                                                 
27 HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 7; GAO TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 6, at 19. 
28 See GAO TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 6, at 21. Note that, though the exact cost to government is unknown, 
“the sum of tax expenditure revenue over time probably provides a good approximation of the general trend in the 
effect of tax expenditures on income tax revenue…[because] it is unlikely that the bias from simply summing tax 
expenditures estimates changes much from year to year.” HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 7 (emphasis added). See 
supra Part I for a discussion of general trends in tax expenditures. 
29 Toder, Tax Cuts, supra note 11, at 365. 
30 Toder, Evaluating, supa note 16, at 56. 
31 HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 14. 
32 Id. 
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taxpayer “frustration and resentment.”33 Tax expenditures may also be more susceptible to fraud 
than direct spending programs because fraud in tax expenditures is only detected through random 
IRS audits, whereas direct spending programs involve individual eligibility assessments for each 
applicant.34 
 
B. Accountability 
Because tax expenditures are not annually renewed in the appropriations process like 
ordinary spending, tax expenditure programs are rarely or never scrutinized for effectiveness.35 
Whereas most line items in the budget are defended in detail by the responsible agencies in 
lengthy “budget justification” documents, in oversight hearings, and performance audits, tax 
expenditure programs are not generally subject to such oversight.36 Theoretically, the 
Administration is required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 199337 and OMB 
Circular A-1138 to perform annual evaluations of tax expenditures, but the Clinton 
Administration confessed to being “unenthusiastic” about them and the Bush Administration 
never performed any at all.39 This problem is compounded by the fact that many individual 
government agencies are reluctant to take responsibility for tax expenditures that arguably touch 
upon their policy spheres.40 
                                                 
33 CENTURY FOUND., supra note 8, at 12. 
34 Id. at 19. 
35 Westmoreland, supra note 11, at 1586. 
36 See GAO TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 6, at 68-71. 
37 Pub. L. 103-63 (1993). 
38 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-11§33.6, 
PREPARATION SUBMISSION AND EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET (2008), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a11/current_year/a_11_2008.pdf. Notably, the OMB circular contains 
only about one-half of one page on guidance with respect to tax expenditures out of a 704-page document. 
39 HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 8. 
40 See GAO TAX EXPENDITURES, at 67 (“OMB officials told us that some agencies see tax expenditures as closely 
related to what they do and some do not, or agencies might not have enough knowledge about tax expenditures to 
consider them carefully.”). 
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Even if comprehensive analyses were rigorously conducted, the Congressional budget 
process does not place tax expenditures in direct competition with non-tax spending programs.41 
Congress virtually never considers trading off a tax expenditure for a direct spending program 
(or, for that matter, vice-versa) because each type of spending takes a different path through 
Congress.42 If a performance evaluation concluded that a discretionary spending program would 
be preferable to an existing tax expenditure, in most cases a bill to make such a substitution 
would be required to move through multiple committees.43 For example, first a tax writing 
committee would report (and Congress would have to pass) legislation repealing the expenditure. 
Then, an authorizing committee would have to authorize the new discretionary spending 
program. Finally, funds for the program would have to be included in an annual appropriation 
bill. By contrast, the appropriations committees can often directly trade-off funds between 
programs when fashioning annual appropriations legislation.44 
 
C. Progressivity 
If a member of Congress proposed that the government write a check to all taxpayers to 
help pay for the cost of a mortgage, but stipulated that richer taxpayers with larger houses should 
receive bigger checks and less well-off taxpayers should receive smaller checks (or no checks at 
                                                 
41 See Westmoreland, supra note 11, at 1586. 
42 JCT RECONSIDERATION, supra note 11, at n.9. 
43 SCHICK, supra note 10, at 172; HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 9. Each of the tax-writing committees do have 
jurisdiction over some spending programs, and so in theory a bill to trade-off a tax expenditure with spending on one 
of those programs might be simpler. HUNGERFORD, supra note, at 9. For example, the Senate Finance Committee 
has jurisdiction over both tax legislation and the Medicare program. See U.S. SENATE, 11TH CONGRESS, RULES OF 
THE SENATE, RULE XXV(1)(i) (2009), available at 
http://rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=HowCongressWorks.RulesOfSenate. 
44 But see Westmoreland, supra note 11, at 1582 (describing how subcommittee jurisdictional issues can “force 
choices between two worthy subcommittee priorities while leaving less worthy programs outside the jurisdiction 
unscathed”). 
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all), such a proposal would be “laughed out of Congress” 45 for its “upside-down” 46 subsidy. 
And yet, the Code achieves precisely that effect by providing a deduction for interest paid on 
home mortgages.47 A similarly absurd example would be if Congress enacted a program that 
paid part of college tuition costs for families making between $25,000 and $100,000 per year, 
but gave no support to families making under $25,000 per year.48 Yet this very result is achieved 
through the HOPE scholarship tax credit.49 
                                                
More generally, tax expenditures like specialized deductions give greater benefits to 
wealthier taxpayers for two reasons. First, a deduction or exclusion is worth more to a taxpayer 
in a higher income bracket than it is to a taxpayer in a lower income bracket.50 Second, 
deductions are only valuable to a taxpayer if that taxpayer itemizes (i.e., does not use the 
standard deduction). Richer taxpayers are far more likely to itemize than lower-income 
taxpayers.51 Finally, because most tax expenditure provisions are complex, they are most likely 
to be taken advantage of by more sophisticated taxpayers or taxpayers who can afford to hire an 
accountant.52 
 
45 Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct 
Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 722 (1970). 
46 Toder, Tax Cuts, supra note 11, at 6; Ettlinger, supra note 8, at 102. 
47 See I.R.C. §162(h)(2)(C) (2006).  
48 CENTURY FOUN., supra note 8, at 13. See also id. at 14 (describing how the revenues lost due to the HOPE credit 
could have instead been used to expand eligibility for Pell Grants); infra note 91 (describing then-candidate Barack 
Obama’s tax plans, including a proposal to make the HOPE credit refundable). 
49 See I.R.C. §25A(d) (2006) (adjusted gross income limitation on HOPE credit). 
50 For example, a taxpayer in the 35% tax bracket who deducts $10,000 in mortgage interest sees their tax liability 
decrease by $3,500, while a taxpayer in the 15% bracket sees their liability decrease by only $1,500.  
51 See, e.g., ERIC J. TODER & CAROL ROSENBERG, THE TAX POLICY CENTER (URBAN INSTITUTE AND THE 
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION), THE SHARE OF TAXPAYERS WHO ITEMIZE DEDUCTIONS IS GROWING (2007), 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1001054_Share_of_Taxpayers.pdf (explaining that the percentage of taxpayers 
who itemized grew to 35% in 2004, but that these taxpayers were overwhelmingly above the 50th percentile in 
income). 
52 See HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 13. 
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Hard data confirm these general intuitions about the distributional implications of tax 
expenditures. Using the Suits progressivity index,53 CRS calculated that many of the largest tax 
expenditures have severely regressive effects, with the worst offenders being the exclusion of 
interest on state and local government bonds, the deductibility of state and local government 
taxes, and the deductibility of charitable contributions.54 For example, the average taxpayer 
making less than $16,200 per year would realize only $7.19 in tax savings as a result of the 
exclusion from income of employer-provided health insurance coverage, the average taxpayer 
making between $16,200 and $31,000 would realize about $100 in savings, and the average 
taxpayer making over $81,514 would realize $1,482.17 in savings.55 More generally, all tax 
expenditures combined increase after-tax income by 12.8% for taxpayers in the top 20% of the 
income distribution, but by less than 7% for taxpayers in the bottom 20% of the income 
distribution.56 
 
D. Benefits of Tax Expenditures 
Despite these downsides, in certain circumstances a tax expenditure may be easier to 
administer than an ordinary spending program. Using the tax code to implement policy can 
obviate the need for an entirely new bureaucracy to distribute benefits—instead, the program 
merely piggybacks on the existing income tax reporting and refund system. Taxpayers are 
already required to file returns with the IRS, so tax expenditures do not require a “new point of 
                                                 
53 The Suits index is calculated by drawing Lorenz curves that relate the cumulative percentage of tax benefits with 
the cumulative percentage of income and comparing the deviation from perfectly proportional benefits (i.e., 
taxpayers who collectively earn 50% of all taxable income receive 50% of all tax benefits from the deduction). The 
index ranges from -1 (all benefits go to the richest) to +1 (all benefits go to the poorest). See HUNGERFORD, supra 
note 2, at 23-24. 
54 Id. at 19-20. 
55 Id. at 21. 
56 HUANG & SHAW, supra note 2, at 2. 
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contact” between the government and a program’s intended beneficiaries.57 Tax expenditures 
may be particularly efficient if eligibility for a particular benefit depends on information already 
provided to the government on a tax return or through the withholding system.58 Eligibility for 
the EITC, for example, depends almost entirely on the income a taxpayer has earned over the 
course of the year. Thus, setting up the EITC as a separate government program with a separate 
administrative apparatus would be redundant and would needlessly require taxpayers to provide 
the government with the same information twice. The intended beneficiaries may also be more 
likely to claim a tax benefit than a direct spending benefit, because direct spending programs 
may require jumping through more bureaucratic hoops or may entail the stigma of being labeled 
a “welfare recipient.”59 
The key point that is emphasized throughout the literature and that underlies this paper is 
not that all tax expenditures are bad policy or that tax expenditures are never an appropriate 
policy tool.60 Rather, the problem lies in the way the budget process and political dynamics 
incentivize using tax expenditures to achieve policy objectives even when an alternative method 
would be more fiscally responsible and less regressive. 
 
III. DEFINITIONAL ISSUES 
The Budget Act defines “tax expenditures” as  
those revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow 
a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide 
a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability….61 
 
                                                 
57 CENTURY FOUND., supra note 8, at 20; Toder, Tax Cuts, supra note 11, at 368. 
58 Toder, Tax Cuts, supra note 11, at 369. 
59 CENTURY FOUND., supra note 8, at 20. 
60 See, e.g., Toder, Evaluating, supra note 16, at 49 (“Labeling a program a tax expenditure does not itself say 
whether it is a good or a bad program.”). 
61 2 U.S.C. §622(3) (2006). 
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While many tax provisions clearly fit within this definition, the meaning of “special” is 
somewhat ambiguous. Historically, “special” was defined in reference to some baseline notion of 
federal revenues.62 That is, if the federal government was not “supposed” to be taxing a 
particular activity or source of income in the first place, the exclusion of tax on that income has 
not cost the government any forgone revenue. Thus, estimating the total level of tax expenditures 
required a comparison to some sort of “normal” tax system. Not surprisingly, defining what is 
the “normal” tax system, and thus what is a tax expenditure, has been a continuing source of 
controversy.63 Some conservatives objected that the very concept of tax expenditures implied 
that all income intrinsically “belonged” to the federal government.64 But most other critics 
accept the underlying analytical insights of tax expenditure analysis, but criticize the norm
judgments necessary to design a “normal” tax baseline.
ative 
                                                
65 
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 197466 requires the Joint 
House-Senate Committee on Taxation (JCT) to prepare an annual list of tax expenditures to 
Congress.67 For years, JCT prepared an estimate of the federal tax expenditure budget (TEB) 
 
62 JCT RECONSIDERATION, supra note 14, at 20-24. 
63 See Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal “Tax Subsidies” in the National Budget, 22 NAT. TAX. J. 244 (1969), 
for the earliest academic criticism of the “normal” tax concept. 
64 SCHICK, supra note 10, at 172; JCT RECONSIDERATION, supra note 14, at 35 (describing the “every last penny” 
argument). See also JCT RECONSIDERATION, supra note 14, at 38, for a compelling rejoinder to this argument. 
Specifically, tax expenditure analysis does not require an income tax at all, much less specify any particular rate 
structure. Tax expenditure analysis takes as given the current system of progressive income taxation and the current 
rate structure, and simply identifies specially targeted deviations from that general scheme. If tomorrow the current 
income tax system were completely replaced with a straight national sales tax, with no special exceptions, the JCT 
would conclude that tax expenditures totaled $0.  
65 Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax Legislative Processes, 43 B.C. L. REV. 
863, 876 (2002) (“Although the [tax expenditure] concept itself is not especially controversial, arriving at a mutually 
acceptable definition of what constitutes a tax expenditure has proven quite intractable.”). See JCT 
RECONSIDERATION, supra note 14, at 29-33 for a summary of academic criticisms of the traditional normal tax base. 
66 Pub. L. 93-344 (1974). 
67 Technically the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 requires the Congressional Budget Office to 
prepare those estimates, but subsequent provisions have required CBO to rely on the JCT’s figures due to that 
Committee’s special expertise on taxation issues. See 2 U.S.C. §61(f); STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH 
CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2008-2012 n.2 (Comm. Print 2008), 
available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-08.pdf. 
13 
 
based on its own concept of a “normal” income tax. The JCT, as a nonpartisan committee, kept 
this baseline consistent over the years.68 Over the same period, the Department of Treasury has 
also estimated a tax expenditure budget, but its methodology has changed from Administration to 
Administration.69 Lamenting being “[d]riven off track by seemingly endless debates about what 
should and should not be included in the ‘normal’ tax base,” the JCT staff has recently developed 
an innovative new conception of tax expenditures that captures the same information but does 
not require comparison to a hypothetical baseline tax system.70  
The JCT’s new approach abolishes the idea of a “normal” tax baseline without losing any 
analytical power. The JCT now identifies two types of tax expenditures: tax subsidies and tax-
induced structural distortions.71 Under the JCT’s definition, a tax subsidy is a provision of the 
tax code that is “deliberately inconsistent with an identifiable general rule of the present tax law 
(and not some hypothetical “normal” tax).”72 Thus, identifying a tax subsidy does not requi
normative judgment about what the tax system “should” be or what tax rules are “normal,” but is 
defined solely by reference to the provisions of the tax code itself.
re a 
                                                
73 However, this new category 
does not capture all of items the JCT had previously identified as tax expenditures.74 JCT’s 
second tax expenditure category of “tax-induced structural” distortions is defined not by 
reference to any baseline, but includes any tax rule that creates economic allocative efficiency 
losses.75 This definition encompasses any inconsistency within the tax code that distorts 
 
68 HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 2. 
69 Id. See also Linda Sugin, Sustaining Progressivity in the Budget Process: A Commentary on Gale & Orszag’s An 
Economic Assessment of Tax Policy in the Bush Administration, 2001-2004, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1259, 1274-82 (2004) 
(accusing the Bush Administration of manipulating the TEB baseline so as to make tax expenditures appear less 
regressive than they actually are). 
70 JCT RECONSIDERATION, supra note 14, at 1. 
71 Id. at 9-10. 
72 Id. at 9. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 10. 
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economic incentives, but does not specify which method of resolving the inconsistency is 
“correct.”76 Most tax expenditures that present the most troubling accountability and equity 
concerns are “tax subsidies” under the JCT’s new definition.77 The JCT’s new definition in 
practice makes little difference in terms of what tax provisions are counted as tax expenditures,78 
but hopefully the new definition will attract less criticism because it is based on more objective 
criteria. 
While critics may still quibble with the JCT’s approach, the key point is that the concept 
of a tax expenditure is useful even without universal agreement as to what tax policies are 
normatively superior. As the JCT correctly notes, the concept of tax expenditures is not, as some 
conservatives charge, a philosophical commentary about the nature of the tax system—it is 
merely an analytic tool for assessing the government’s fiscal commitment to various 
programmatic objectives. Having a clear, consistent definition—any definition—is far more 
important than the exact contours of any definition.79 Once identified, tax expenditures can then 
be assessed on their own merits.80  
 For the purposes of the rest of this paper, I implicitly assume the JCT’s definition of tax 
expenditures, but the reforms listed in the next section would be useful under any reasonable 
                                                 
76 Id. at 42. For example, the deferral of earnings of foreign subsidiaries is a distortion because of its effect on firm 
behavior, but defining this provision as a structural distortion does not necessarily imply that the optimal solution is 
either a territorial tax regime or a “full inclusion” regime (which would be the “polar opposite” resolution). Id. 
77 Id. at 42, 47. 
78 Id. at 47. 
79 See CENTURY FOUND., supra note 8, at 8 (“[M]ost tax expenditures on the OMB/JCT lists would be counted as tax 
breaks under any reasonable definition.”). 
80 I do not mean to suggest that the choice of definition is completely irrelevant. Indeed, as the examples above 
show, the choice of definition may impact which tax provisions are characterized as expenditures and which are not. 
But, as JCT writes, the debate over the definition of tax expenditures is ultimately a distraction from the core point 
that a variety of tax code provisions routinely escape the rigorous review that other budgetary provisions are 
subjected to as a matter of course. The mere fact that setting a definition requires a normative judgment to some 
degree does not make the whole exercise worthless. If Congress makes a deliberate decision that a particular 
category of tax provision is analytically distinct from a tax expenditure, and that therefore that provision should be 
privileged from the reforms I propose below, then at least some accountability has been achieved for that provision 
through the initial setting of the definition. 
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definition as long as it remains consistent and is not manipulated for short-term political gain. 
Alternatively, the reforms I propose below could apply only to the “tax subsidies” category 
developed by the JCT. That category is likely to capture the vast majority of items which are 
troubling for equity or transparency reasons anyway,81 and the “tax subsidy” category may prove 
to be less politically controversial than the “tax-induced structural distortion” category (if only 
because it is easier to understand). 
 
IV. REFORM PROPOSALS 
The reforms I propose below vary in their degree of current political viability. For the 
most part, the more politically contentious proposals would also be the most effective at curbing 
the growth of tax expenditures or increasing their transparency, accountability, and equity. But 
the most viable proposals can still be very useful. Additionally, even a failed push for the more 
aggressive proposals can help bring attention to the problems inherent in the use of tax 
expenditures, and might spur greater self-discipline by Congress. 
 
A. Default Refundability 
Many of the most glaring downsides of tax expenditures described above82—notably lack 
of transparency, accountability, and equity—are mitigated if the provisions are structured as 
refundable tax credits rather than deductions or exclusions. First, refundable credits do not grant 
a disproportionate benefit to higher income taxpayers because they are unaffected by marginal 
rates and because credits may be taken advantage of by taxpayers who do not itemize. 
Additionally, even the one-third of taxpayers who have no federal income tax liability can 
                                                 
81 JCT RECONSIDERATION, supra note 14, at 42, 47. 
82 See supra Part II. 
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benefit from refundable credits.83 For example, a deduction for the cost of installing home solar 
panels would be worth more for a taxpayer in the 35% bracket than a taxpayer in the 25% 
bracket, and would be worth nothing at all to taxpayers who do not itemize or who do not have 
any income tax liability. But a refundable tax credit for 25% of the cost of solar panels would be 
worth the same to every taxpayer regardless of circumstances. Additionally, the cost of 
refundable tax credits to the government is more transparent. Unlike deductions and exclusions, 
the repeal of which might push a taxpayer into a higher bracket or might cause a taxpayer to 
begin claiming the standard deduction,84 refundable credits will not otherwise affect a taxpayer’s 
situation. In essence, a refundable credit is just a direct cash subsidy from the government—the 
rest of the tax code is completely irrelevant to its implementation. 
The use of refundable tax credits instead of more traditional tax devices like exclusions 
and deductions has been growing, albeit slowly. The most important credit of this kind today is 
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which provides tax benefits to lower-income workers as 
they increase their wages and thereby reduce their entitlement to government social services 
programs. Until 1975, there were no refundable tax credits,85 and between 1975 and 1997, the 
EITC was the only refundable credit.86 As of the 2008 tax year, the tax code contained only three 
refundable tax credits: the EITC, the Child Tax Credit (only partially refundable), and a small 
refundable health insurance credit.87 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(more commonly known as the “stimulus bill”) created a new “Making Work Pay” refundable 
                                                 
83 Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., & Peter Orszag, Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for 
Refundable Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 52 (2006). 
84 See supra Part II.A (describing interaction effects between tax deductions). 
85 Bachelder, Goldberg & Orszag, supra note 83, at 25. 
86 Toder, Tax Cuts, supra note 11, at 366. 
87 Bachelder, Goldberg & Orszag , supra note 83, at 33. 
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tax credit that takes effect for the 2009 tax year.88 But although the total number of refundable 
tax credits still remains small, Congress has dramatically expanded the refundability of the EITC 
and the Child Tax Credit over the past two decades,89 and politicians from both parties have 
proposed various refundable credits recently.90 Indeed, in the 2008 Presidential Campaign, 
refundable credit proposals were a centerpiece of the domestic agendas of both major party 
candidates.91 
Despite these trends and the bipartisan support for refundability,92 some strenuously 
object to the refundability of tax credits because of the potential that individuals with no current 
federal income tax liability could end up receiving a check from the government.93 In response 
to this criticism, Batchelder, Goldberg, and Orszag defend the refundability of tax credits o
grounds other than distributional equity, which they fear is subject to “deep partisan divides.”
n 
                                                
94 
Instead, Batchelder, Goldberg, and Orszag show that, in the vast majority of cases, refundable 
credits are the most economically efficient means of subsidizing particular behavior through the 
 
88 I.R.C. §36(A) (West 2009); Internal Revenue Service, “The Making Work Pay Tax Credit,” 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=204447,00.html (last visited April 20, 2009). 
89 Bachelder, Goldberg & Orszag, supra note 83, at 38-39. Refundable credits have also been expanding at the state 
level. Id. at 38. 
90 See id. at 40-41 (describing Bush Administration proposals to create various refundable credits). See also infra 
note 91. 
91 See Tax Policy Center, Major Provisions of the McCain and Obama Tax Plans, 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/tpccontent/tax_plan_matrix_0908.pdf (last visited April 2, 2009). Sen. John McCain 
proposed a refundable credit to replace the current exclusion from income of employer-provided health insurance. 
Then-Sen. Barack Obama proposed making several existing credits refundable, including the Child and Dependent 
Care Tax Credit, the Saver’s Credit, and the HOPE Credit, and proposed a number of entirely new tax provisions 
that would be structured as refundable credits, including the “Making Work Pay” credit. Id. The “Making Work 
Pay” credit was passed into law in 2009. Supra note 88. President Obama’s preference for refundable credits is also 
evidenced in his selection of Dr. Peter Orszag, a proponent of refundable credits, to serve as Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget. See Bachelder, Goldberg & Orszag, supra note 83. 
92 See supra notes 91-92. See also Bachelder, Goldberg & Orszag, supra note 83 (supporting refundable credits as a 
“default”). Notably, Mr. Goldberg was an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury under President George H.W. Bush, 
so the support for refundable credits is by no means confined to the political left. Indeed, the idea of refundable tax 
credits is traceable to Milton and Rose Friedman (economists who remain icons of the conservative movement), who 
created the idea of the “negative income tax.” See id. at 32. 
93 See, e.g., Peter Ferrara, Obama’s Tax Plan is Really a Welfare Plan, WALL ST. J., August 19, 2008, at A17, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121910303529751345.html. 
94 Bachelder, Goldberg & Orszag, supra note 83, 25-26. 
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tax code.95 Specifically, because the benefit from a refundable credit is not dependent on a 
taxpayer’s overall tax situation, a refundable credit perfectly mimics the classical economic idea 
of a “Pigouvian subsidy” for an individual to engage in socially beneficial behavior.96 Indeed, 
even if the underlying activity subsidized is actually bad for society, a refundable credit ends up 
less wasteful than a deduction or exclusion.97 
Thus, even with the potentially polarizing distributional issues of tax expenditures set 
aside, the combination of efficiency and transparency justifications for refundable credits creates 
a unique opportunity to expand the existing bipartisan support for this approach. Batchelder, 
Goldberg, and Orszag argue that these justifications show that a refundable credit should be the 
default for all tax incentives.98 Bachelder, Goldberg and Orszag do not propose any particular 
mechanism to enforce such a default, but the procedural rules of each house of Congress could 
be modified to build the preference for refundable credits directly into the budget process. For 
example, a rule could be passed in the House and Senate stating 
It shall not be in order to consider any bill, joint resolution, amendment, or 
conference report which includes a new tax expenditure, unless that tax 
expenditure is structured as a credit against tax imposed without any limitation 
based on the amount of regular tax liability.99 
 
                                                 
95 Bachelder, Goldberg & Orszag, supra note 83. Accord CENTURY FOUND., supra note 8, at 20 (“…if there are to be 
explicit subsidies through the tax code, they should generally be designed as credits that provide the same subsidy 
rate to all taxpayers.”). 
96 Bachelder, Goldberg & Orszag, supra note 83, at 44-45. 
97 Id. at 47-49. For example, given the recent troubles in the housing market, the advisability of subsidizing home 
mortgages through the tax code at all might seem questionable. But as Bachelder, Goldberg, and Orszag show, even 
if it were generally economically inefficient to subsidize home mortgages, it would be less wasteful for the 
government to spend $1 billion subsidizing mortgages with refundable credits than with deductions. This result 
holds because, absent any evidence that consumer demand elasticity for the subsidized activity is different across 
income groups, a uniform subsidy minimizes the expected economic distortion and deadweight loss. Readers more 
interested in the microeconomic logic of this argument are advised to see Bachelder, Goldberg & Orszag’s paper, 
which illuminates the key effects and assumptions very clearly. 
98 Id. at 24. 
99 Cf. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 111TH CONGRESS, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RULE 
XXI(10), Jan. 28, 2009, available at http://www.rules.house.gov/ruleprec/111th.pdf (the House pay-as-you-go or 
“PAYGO” rule). 
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Such a provision would also require a rule defining “tax expenditure,” either based on the 
JCT’s definition or some other definition.100 Again, a variety of possible definitions would be 
acceptable. A definition based on the JCT’s “tax subsidy” concept might read something like “A 
tax expenditure is a provision providing for a new deduction, exclusion from income, or credit 
against income tax due that is inconsistent with the current Internal Revenue Code.”101 Such a 
definition would necessarily require the parliamentarian to exercise some degree of judgment on 
close calls, but this is already true with respect to enforcement of budget reconciliation rules, for 
example.102 Additionally, classifying a new provision as a tax expenditure is likely to be a much 
less controversial exercise than discriminating between existing provisions, since there is a clear 
baseline for comparison (i.e., the existing code). 
 This rule could then be enforced by any member on the floor with a point of order. The 
effectiveness of a point of order as an enforcement mechanism is mitigated to the extent that a 
point of order may be waived, either by a vote of the entire body or through a special rule passed 
by the House Rules Committee.103 Although budget rules can be circumvented relatively easily 
by the majority in the House, rules typically have more bite in the Senate where a three-fifths 
majority is required to waive most points of order,104 and so these mechanisms can still provide a 
meaningful constraint on the temptation to enact policy through the tax code. Even though such 
budget rules have certainly been manipulated over the years,105 they have provided a net positive 
force for fiscal discipline,106 and thus the use of these familiar procedural tools holds some 
                                                 
100 See supra Part III.  
101 See JCT RECONSIDERATION, supra note 14, at 9. 
102 See, e.g., SCHICK, supra note 10, at 146-49, Box 6-2. 
103 Block, supra note 65, at 881. 
104 See id. at 881, 885, 933-34. 
105 See, e.g., id. at 888-924. 
106 Id. at 919 (“Despite the gimmicks, most commentators agree that the modern legislative budget process has 
provided valuable restraints and imposed an element of self-discipline on Congress….”). 
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promise for constraining the temptation to enact more and more federal policy through the tax 
code. 
In some cases, making a tax expenditure refundable may be infeasible, either politically 
or practically. But in those cases, the procedural rules proposed here will create an incentive for 
designing such programs as direct or discretionary spending rather than as a tax break, as they 
ordinarily should be absent an independent efficiency justification.107  
 
B. Limited Deductibility for Top Brackets 
A less dramatic, but also less effective, means of limiting the expansion of tax 
expenditures than default refundability would be to create default rules which limit the extent to 
which any deduction or exclusion can be claimed by a taxpayer. For instance, President Obama’s 
first budget proposed limiting the extent to which wealthier taxpayers could claim certain 
itemized deductions.108 Under the proposal, certain deductions would count only as if the 
taxpayer were in the 28% tax bracket, in essence making the deductions function a little bit more 
like non-refundable credits. Applying these same ideas to future tax expenditures would limit 
their costs and their regressive effects to some degree, albeit less than if the expenditures were 
instead structured as refundable credits.109 This weaker measure could be enforced in the same 
manner as the default refundable credits option. For example, the rule might instead state “It 
shall not be in order to consider a bill, or an amendment to any bill, adding any new tax 
deduction, unless the tax deduction is limited such that no taxpayer may claim the deduction as if 
                                                 
107 See CENTURY FOUND., supra note 8, at 22 (“But the very need to make these programs refundable is a strong 
argument for keeping them out of the tax system altogether and moving them to the spending side of the budget.”). 
108 Jackie Calmes & Robert Pear, To Pay for Health Care, Obama Looks to Taxes on Affluent, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 
2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/26/us/politics/26budget.html. 
109 Limiting deductibility does not fully replicate refundable credits because deductions would still have no utility to 
taxpayers who do not itemize or who pay no income taxes. 
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their marginal rate were greater than 28%.” The applicable percent could instead be replaced 
with a more flexible reference like “as if they were subject to the third highest marginal rate,” to 
accommodate future marginal rate changes. 
Even this proposal is likely to be somewhat controversial. Congress and the charitable 
organization community reacted particularly coolly to the Obama Administration’s proposal to 
limit the deductibility of charitable deductions,110 in spite of evidence that suggested that the 
proposal would have a negligible effect on charitable giving rates.111 An amendment opposing 
the change for charitable deductions passed the Senate 94-3,112 and the final fiscal year 2010 
budget resolution did not include the proposal.113 But the proposal would likely engender much 
less opposition if it only applied to new tax credits rather than existing credits which have 
already built up strong constituencies. Even with this limitation, the proposal would still serve as 
an effective check on the future proliferation of tax deductions. 
 
C. Inclusion in the Outlay Totals 
Perhaps the simplest measure to constrain the growth of tax expenditures would be to 
include tax expenditures in the annual budget as part of total outlays rather than as decreases to 
revenues. A more modest change supported by the GAO would be for OMB to include tax 
                                                 
110 See, e.g., Stephen Dinan & David R. Sands, Charity Tax Limits Upset Many, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2009, 
available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/feb/27/charity-tax-challenged-by-political-friends/. 
111 PAUL N. VAN DE WATER, CTR. FOR BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, PROPOSAL TO CAP DEDUCTIONS FOR HIGH-
INCOME HOUSEHOLDS WOULD REDUCE CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS BY ONLY 1.9 PERCENT, WOULD HELP TO 
FINANCE UNIVERSAL HEALTH COVERAGE 1 (2009), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/3-3-09bud.pdf. 
112 U.S. Senate, Roll Call 00138, S.Amdt. 103 to S.Con.Res. 13, April 2, 2009, available at 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=0013
8. 
113 E.g., Janet Hook, Congress’ Budget shorts Obama plans to shift wealth, L.A. TIMES, April 30, 2009, available at 
http://www.latimes.com/news/la-na-budget30-2009apr30,0,5614049.story?page=1. 
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expenditure revenue losses alongside outlay totals in the President’s budget.114 OMB actually 
began taking this approach for the fiscal year 1998 budget, but the policy was discontinued for 
the fiscal year 2002 budget.115 While in some sense such a change would be entirely cosmetic—
just moving a number from the revenue to the spending side of the ledger—it would have 
important political implications. First, more accessible information about the scope and nature of 
tax expenditures might deter their overuse.116 Second, since tax expenditures would be counted 
as spending, no longer would a member of Congress be able to claim credit for both cutting taxes 
and cutting spending merely by shifting more federal spending to the tax code.  
Including all tax expenditures in the outlay totals would also remove the disincentive in 
current law to structuring tax expenditures as refundable credits. Presently, most tax expenditures 
are reflected in the budget totals only through decreased projected revenues. However, the 
refundable portion of refundable credit provisions appears in the budget as an outlay.117 Thus, a 
member who structures his or her program as a refundable credit can be derided for “increasing 
spending,” while a member who structures his or her subsidy proposal as a less transparent and 
more regressive tax deduction is championed as a tax cutter. 
  
D. Sunset Rules 
Unlike discretionary appropriations and authorizations, which typically last a definite 
period of time such as one year, a tax expenditure remains until repealed or until it “sunsets” by 
its own provisions. If a tax expenditure does not contain a sunset, then Congress has no set 
                                                 
114 GAO Tax EXPENDITURES, supra note 6, at 59, 73. The Bush Administration OMB was very cool to this proposal, 
reiterating its objections to the very concept of tax expenditures. Id. at 82-87. 
115 Id. at 59. 
116 CENTURY FOUND., supra note 6, at 28. See also GAO TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 6, at 59 (“Integrating tax 
expenditure costs in the annual budget presentation is crucial to providing a comprehensive picture of federal 
resources to facilitate reexamining the base.”) 
117 Toder, Evaluating, supra note 16, at 56. 
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opportunity to revisit the provision to assess its effectiveness. If Congress must renew a tax 
provision, it at least has an opportunity to reconsider the law “in light of increasing fiscal 
concerns, renewed caution, or other relevant post-enactment developments.”118 To encourage 
more tax expenditures to be subject to this constant renewal process, yet another House and 
Senate rule could be created that prohibits consideration of any tax expenditure that lasts longer 
than a specified length of time.  
However, adding sunsets to tax expenditures creates many additional problems. First, 
sunsets may complicate tax planning, and thus reduce the benefit of any expiring tax 
provision.119 Second, sunsets can allow politicians to continuously extract political rents from 
constituencies that benefit from tax expenditures since these groups must constantly lobby for 
renewal.120 Additionally, in practice many tax expenditures are routinely extended again and 
again despite their sunset provisions. As of 2006, only two tax “extender” provisions have ever 
been allowed to expire.121 In practice, many extremely popular provisions that Congress has 
every intention of extending repeatedly are given sunsets not to increase accountability, but in 
order to comply with PAYGO rules.122 Because a permanent repeal would require too many 
offsets, it is often more politically expedient for Congress to only extend a provision for a few 
years at a time.123 Because the CBO is required to assume current law when making its long-
term fiscal projections, this strategy can have the consequence of reducing budgetary 
                                                 
118 Sugin, supra note 69, at 1269. 
119 Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy of Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. 
REV. 335, 368-69 (2006); Sugin, supra note 69, at 1271 (describing in particular the burden on lower-income 
families of unpredictability in the tax code). 
120 Kysar, supra note 199, at 362-68, 393-94. 
121 Id. at 358, n.163. Occasionally, a provision expires but then Congress applies an extension retroactively. Id. 
122 Id. at 359-62. 
123 Id. 
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transparency and hiding the true long-term fiscal impact of tax cuts.124 Piecemeal sunsets also 
make it politically easier to allow tax benefits for low-income families to slowly disappear.125 
                                                
In practice, PAYGO and the Senate’s Byrd Rule already create strong incentives for tax 
expenditures to sunset.126 Given these existing structural incentives, and given the fact that many 
tax expenditures are routinely extended anyway,127 an additional rule requiring sunsets would 
probably not be particularly effective by itself in reducing tax expenditures or increasing their 
accountability, and could bring other downsides.128 However, even if a structural solution is not 
appropriate here, when enacting new tax expenditures Congress should carefully consider the 
transparency and accountability implications of adding sunsets. If a provision is designed as a 
short-term or experimental replacement for a discretionary program, sunsets can make tax 
expenditures receive a level of accountability and oversight more on par with their discretionary 
spending cousins. But if the expenditure is clearly intended to become a permanent feature of the 
tax code, sunsets only obscure the true long-run fiscal impact of a provision. 
  
E. Require Prior Authorization by Authorizing Committees 
The solution to the growth of tax expenditures that would require the most revolutionary 
change to the budget process would be to require that tax expenditures be “authorized” before 
being passed by a tax-writing committee, in much the same way that discretionary spending must 
be authorized before being appropriated by the appropriations committees. This approach in 
 
124 See William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, Sunsets in the Tax Code, TAX NOTES 1553, June 9, 2003. See also 
SCHICK, supra note 10, at 178-79, Box 7-2 (describing the political strategy for including sunsets in the Bush tax cut 
packages). 
125 Sugin, supra note 69, at 1270-71. 
126 Kysar, supra note 199, at 359-62; SCHICK, supra note 10, at 178-79, Box 7-2. 
127 See supra note 121. 
128 In fact, for these reasons Gale & Orszag argue that rules should be created that discourage sunsets. Gale & 
Orszag, supra note 124, at 1559. 
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essence treats tax expenditures like any other spending, requiring a two-step approval process 
before a tax expenditure can become law. For example, Rule XXI(2)(a)(1) of the Rules of the 
House states “An appropriation may not be reported in a general appropriation bill, and may not 
be in order as an amendment thereto, for an expenditure not previously authorized by law….”129 
A parallel rule for tax expenditures might state “A tax expenditure may not be reported in any 
bill, and may not be in order as an amendment, unless previously authorized by law.” Again, this 
rule would also need to be accompanied by a rule defining tax expenditures.130 
Requiring tax expenditures to be authorized would have a number of important 
advantages. First, it would place tax expenditures on an equal procedural footing with ordinary 
spending, thus eliminating an artificial political incentive for a member to use the tax code rather 
than the appropriations process to achieve a particular policy objective. Second, authorizing 
committees may have greater (or, at the very least, different) substantive expertise regarding the 
policy objective at issue. The members of the tax-writing House Ways and Means Committee, 
for instance, could benefit from the insight of members on the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee (which has jurisdiction over health care programs) when it comes to the policy merits 
of tax expenditures for health insurance. Requiring authorization of each tax expenditures would 
give the authorizing committees ownership of each provision, and would create an additional 
point for oversight and accountability. Presumably, an authorizing committee would hold 
oversight hearings over the administration of tax expenditures within their jurisdiction before re-
authorizing them, just as those committees hold hearings before re-authorizing direct spending 
programs.  
                                                 
129 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 111TH CONGRESS, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 34, Jan. 28, 
2009, available at http://www.rules.house.gov/ruleprec/111th.pdf.  
130 See supra text accompanying notes 100-102. 
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Most importantly, the authorization process would also facilitate direct consideration of 
whether a particular policy objective is most efficiently achieved through a tax expenditure or a 
direct expenditure. Currently, even if either a tax writing committee or an authorizing committee 
believed a tax expenditure would be better structured as discretionary spending, a bill to replace 
the tax expenditure with an appropriation would be required to move through multiple 
committees.131 This hurdle adds inertia to the system, and incentivizes proponents of a particular 
policy objective to leave well enough alone and not challenge whether a goal is best achieved 
through the tax code or through discretionary spending. Requiring all tax expenditures to be 
authorized periodically would force authorizing committees to explicitly consider the trade-off 
between tax expenditures and annual appropriations. An authorizing committee that chooses not 
to re-authorize a tax expenditure within its jurisdiction would then free up funds that could be 
used to support other programs under its umbrella instead. 
             Requiring all tax expenditures to be authorized before passage by the tax writing 
committees might also eliminate an implicit disincentive for the tax writing committees to use 
refundable credits rather than more regressive methods. Although Congress agreed in the 1970s 
that the EITC should be solely within the jurisdiction of the tax writing committees, those 
committees may remain fearful that other oversight committees would demand jurisdiction over 
any new refundable credit provisions.132 If all tax expenditures, regardless of form, required 
authorization by other committees anyway, perhaps the tax writing committees would feel more 
freedom to structure such provisions optimally, rather than in a way that preserves their “turf.” 
                                                 
131 HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 9; supra text accompanying notes 42-44. Cf. Westmoreland, supra note 11, at 
1582 (describing how subcommittee jurisdictional issues can “force choices between two worthy subcommittee 
priorities while leaving less worthy programs outside the jurisdiction unscathed”). 
132 Toder, Tax Cuts, supra note 11, at n.12 and accompanying text. 
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The most glaring downside to this proposal is that the tax writing committees can be 
expected to strenuously resist any effort to dilute their authority over tax expenditures.133 On the 
other hand, every other committee is likely to be pleased by the added lever they would gain over 
tax policy. To make the proposal more palatable to the tax writing committees, the tax writing 
committees could be granted authorizing authority over some subset of existing tax expenditures. 
For instance, the House Ways and Means Committee could be given authorizing jurisdiction 
over deductions for charitable giving. If this were the case, the Ways and Means Committee 
would be responsible for both authorizing the charitable giving deduction and enacting it into the 
tax code. More comprehensively, all existing tax expenditures could be grandfathered into the 
new system by giving the tax writing committees jurisdiction over all of them. Only new tax 
expenditures would be subjected to authorization by other committees of jurisdiction. This 
compromise would also please constituencies that benefit from existing tax expenditures. Of 
course, this compromise eliminates the advantages of the proposal for each tax expenditure for 
which the tax writing committees retain authorizing jurisdiction.  
Even if the tax committees successfully shoot down this proposal, perhaps a concerted 
assault on their jurisdiction will at least inspire those committees to be more thoughtful about the 
future proliferation of tax expenditures. Alternatively, even a failed battle for this more 
comprehensive solution may pave the way for some of the less dramatic solutions proposed 
herein. 
 
F. Distribution-Weighted PAYGO 
                                                 
133 See Kysar, supra note 119, at 362-65 (2006) (arguing that tax expenditures for special interests create enormous 
political rents for politicians). 
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Although tax expenditures are not included as outlays in the budget, their growth is 
constrained to a degree by PAYGO rules. But because tax expenditures tend to have a regressive 
effect,134 and because tax expenditures are likely to be offset by decreasing spending programs 
which have progressive effects,135 Linda Sugin argues that PAYGO rules are insufficient to 
protect the poor from regressive policy shifts.136 She proposes that to compensate for this effect, 
Congress adopt a PAYGO system that is weighted for distributional impacts. In Sugin’s 
proposal, “[t]ax cuts that decrease inequality could be subject to lower procedural hurdles than 
tax cuts that increase inequality.”137 
Sugin argues that “details are not crucial to this idea,” and only very generally outlines 
how her proposal might be structured.138 Implementation would obviously require some 
benchmark for progressivity, but these sorts of analyses are routinely conducted using measures 
such as the Suits progressivity index139 or calculations of changes in after-tax income for high-
income and low-income taxpayers.140 It is true that implementation would require CBO to 
project these distributional impacts before floor consideration of any proposed tax change, but 
the CBO scorekeeping already requires substantial guesswork, and as long as the estimate is not 
tainted by political considerations the process can still provide some measure of fiscal 
discipline.141 If the measure chosen shows that the proposed change in tax law would be 
                                                 
134 See supra Part II.C. 
135 See HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 17-18 and Table 3 (showing that the Suits the progressivity index for various 
social welfare spending programs is uniformly positive (i.e., social spending has progressive effects)). 
136 Sugin, supra note 69, at 1262-66. 
137 Id. at 1264. 
138 Id. at n.26 and accompanying text. 
139 HUNGERFORD, supra note 2, at 23; see also supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
140 See William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, An Economic Assessment of Tax Policy in the Bush Administration, 
2001-2004, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1157, 1186-89 (2004) (defending the use of change in after-tax income as the proper 
basis for assessing progressivity); HUANG & SHAW, supra note 2, at 2 (analyzing the distributive impact of tax 
expenditures based on change in after-tax income). 
141 See Westmoreland, supra note 11, at 1574-75 (explaining that even though CBO scores of legislation are merely 
an “educated best guess” that “no one is under any illusion…will prove to be correct,” the CBO score is still a 
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regressive (for example, if the Suits progressivity index for the change is negative, or if the 
projected change in after-tax income is lower for the bottom quintile of taxpayers than the top 
quintile, etc.) then the measure would require a supermajority for passage. Although she does not 
explicitly propose this, Sugin’s proposal could also be applied to tax cuts for businesses, thus 
requiring a supermajority to pass tax breaks that disproportionately benefit big corporations at 
the expense of small businesses. This PAYGO rule could still exclude any change, even if 
progressive, that increases the deficit. The key is that even strictly deficit-neutral legislation 
should require a supermajority for passage if it is particularly regressive. 
This solution is not attractive solely for its distributional impacts. Distribution-weighted 
PAYGO would create a strong incentive for members to structure their tax proposals as 
refundable credits rather than deductions or exclusions because a refundable credit would be 
more likely to pass through the progressivity screen.142 Still, as the most explicitly equity-based 
reform proposal here, this proposal is the most unlikely to attract wide bipartisan support and to 
thus create an enduring political norm against tax expenditures. But even if a distribution-
weighted PAYGO system adopted by the current Democratic congress were to be summarily 
reversed down the line by a Republican congress, its use in the interim could cause politicians 
and the voters they serve to re-think their knee-jerk preference for targeted tax cuts for enacting 
social policy. Additionally, a push for such rule changes could bring to the fore the distributional 
biases in the budget process and make equity concerns more explicitly part of the annual budget 
battle.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
“necessary fiction for budgeting and legislating”). But see Block, supra note 65, for a description of how CBO 
scores can be manipulated, a problem that would have to be carefully monitored under a distribution-weighted 
PAYGO system as well. 
142 See supra Part IV.A for a discussion of the equity, efficiency, and transparency implications of refundable credits 
vis-à-vis other types of tax expenditures. 
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CONCLUSION 
As the debate over the Nation’s long-term fiscal health rages on, controlling tax 
expenditures must be part of the conversation. Tax expenditures represent an increasingly large 
portion of federal commitments, and the current budget rules create strong incentives for elected 
officials to spend money through the tax code rather than through the appropriations process. 
This trend is disturbing not only because of the part it plays in the projected long-term federal 
deficits, but also because tax spending is inherently more regressive and subject to less 
transparency and accountability. A single-minded focus only on reform of entitlement spending 
programs like Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security to the exclusion of the need for tax 
expenditure reform will not only miss a key component of the fiscal dilemma, but will also leave 
us with a government that is less transparent and accountable and less attentive to the needs of 
the most vulnerable in society.
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